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Abstract: 
Equity participation in joint ventures as envisaged in shari‟ah comprises a business 
relationship based on mutual sharing of gains and liability.  Such partnerships established 
among individuals as well as commercial enterprises generally seek to realise the possibility 
of unlimited gains for each partner, without the encumbrance of ensuring a preset capital 
return to a single partner.  Islamic banks need to adopt an approach similar to these and desist 
from furthering their identity as lending institutions, a pioneer step towards which goal would 
be upholding a proper profit and loss sharing mechanism.  For realising the benefits of equity 
financing, its operation should not be hindered through measures that strip it of its 
characteristics.  A central pillar of the equity structure is the unbridled operation of the profit 
sharing ratio.  Restriction of its application to a stipulated level of profits, thereby enabling a 
partner to claim unlimited profits while the profit share of the other is restricted to a maximum 
ceiling cannot be regarded to be consistent with the theory of equity participation.  Any 
measure that curtails the free operation the profit sharing mechanism could result in defeating 
the objectives of equity financing.  Similarly, a provision that envisages the possibility of 
adjusting the profit sharing ratio prior to liquidation does not seem appropriate in the prevalent 
environment of interest based banking, and could be easily misused.   While these measures 
could realise some temporary benefit to Islamic banks, they may become deep-rooted in the 
concept of equity financing itself, thus making it operate subservient to debt financing norms.   
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Title: Measures Affecting the Agreed Profit Sharing Ratio in Joint Ventures Financed 
by Islamic Banks: a Shari’ah Based Evaluation 
 
Introduction 
In ventures financed on equity basis by Islamic banks, while it is ensured in general that the 
profit / loss sharing ratio is fixed at the inception of the contract so as to achieve sharī‛ah 
compliance, certain measures are seen to be adopted sometimes that result in altering the 
mechanism of profit and loss sharing before the finalisation of the venture.  These include the 
option to alter the profit sharing ratio after the inception of the contract.  The sharī‛ah 
perspective of similar measures are analysed hereunder.      
 
Relevance of adjusting profit ratio to equity financing by Islamic banks 
A fundamental principle pertaining to equity based facilities as propounded by the Islamic 
sharī‛ah is the knowledge of the ratio of profit / loss distribution between the partners at the 
inception of the contract.  In equity based facilities offered by Islamic financial institutions, 
this principle is generally adhered to, and the ratio of profit sharing agreed between the bank 
and the client is stipulated in the contractual agreement.  Although the method adopted for 
arriving at this ratio could be subject to discussion
1
, the requirement of laying down the profit 
distribution mechanism as a ratio of the total profit and not as a lump sum or a ratio of the 
capital is generally conceded.  As such, the mushārakah / mudārabah ventures embarked on 
by Islamic banks define the profit shares accruing to the partners as a ratio of the total profit 
realisable through the venture.  This is true both in the case of mudārabah investments made 
by clients in the joint investment accounts offered by the bank as well as where the bank 
invests on an equity basis in diverse ventures with selected clients.  Mudārabah agreements 
for investing in joint investment accounts stipulate the ratio of profit division between the 
bank and the collective body of investors
2
 in such accounts as a ratio such as 30 : 70, 40 : 60 
etc, according to the nature of the account.  This means that at the end of the business cycle 
as publicised by the bank, upon which the profits generated through investment of the funds 
within the cycle are identified usually through a process such as constructive liquidation, such 
profits shall be divided between the bank and the body of investors according to the agreed 
ratio.
3
  Similarly, in equity investments made by the bank in joint ventures with clients, the 
contractual agreement refers to the ratio of profit division between the bank and the joint 
partner.  As discussed in the previous section, the usual process for determining this ratio (or 
more correctly, the profit share of the bank, as the rest is invariably left to form the client‟s 
share) involves calculation for achieving a predetermined return on the capital exposure 
                                                 
1
 See Muhammad Abdurrahman Sadique (2006), “A study of equity financing modes for Islamic financial 
institutions in a Shari‟ah perspective,” unpublished doctoral thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia, p. 
188.   
2
 The ratio of profit distribution in this instance refers to the initial distribution between the bank and the 
collective body of investment account holders.  The share of profit accruing to all the account holders under this 
primary division is thereafter divided among individual account holders, usually taking the amount of funds 
invested by each account holder during the relevant cycle and the total period the funds remained in the account, 
through the process popularly referred to as the „daily-product‟ method.  Although widely adopted for lack of a 
more suitable mechanism and upheld by various sharī‛ah bodies for that reason, it is observed to embody critical 
anomalies that call for a serious review.      
3
 It should be noted that accounting practices play a fundamental role in identifying profits and determining the 
amount of profit generated within a cycle that could be distributed among those who had invested funds during 
the cycle.  This being a topic that merits individual and detailed discussion, it is not fully treated in this research.        
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undertaken by the bank with primary focus on the planned duration of the venture.  The 
capital return calculated thus is converted into a percentage of the expected profit, and the 
basis of profit allocation is reflected as a ratio on the agreement for the purpose of sharī‛ah 
compliance.  Therefore, in both these facets of equity based transactions involving Islamic 
banks, knowledge of the profit sharing ratio is ensured at the inception of the transaction.  As 
regards distribution of loss, agreements for investment in joint investment accounts
4
 as well 
as secondary investment by the bank with clients are observed to lay down clearly that loss 
would be shared in proportion to the capital investment of the parties, as required by the 
sharī‛ah. 
 
However, despite of the clear formulae on profit and loss sharing agreed by the parties in 
such equity ventures, Islamic banks feel constrained at times to incorporate clauses that 
override them and permit the final distribution of profits to be on a footing other than what 
was agreed initially.  This could be achieved through means such as reserving the right to 
alter the profit sharing ratio after the inception of the contract, declaring that profits earned 
over and above a defined ceiling to accrue to one of the contractors unilaterally or that such 
profits would be relinquished by the other partner, and by agreeing on different profit sharing 
ratios for different stratums of profit earned through the venture.  These provisions provide a 
level of flexibility in the division of profits, and are necessitated for purposes such as 
regulating the profits accruing to investment account holders and enabling the bank, where 
losses are not involved, to achieve a minimum level of return on its investments, or 
alternatively, to restrict its income to the due return on capital as dictated by the rate applied, 
while abandoning any additional profit gained above such return to the client.  The latter 
measure is aimed at inducing clients to avail of Islamic banking facilities instead of resorting 
to interest based loans offered by conventional banks, by preventing the profit share of the 
bank from exceeding the interest charged by conventional banks for similar facilities.  
Despite of the reasons that necessitate the employment of such provisions, the level of their 
sharī‛ah admissibility could vary according to the nature of the particular provision.  Two 
such provisions, namely, for unilateral entitlement to profits exceeding a stated amount and 
for revising the profit sharing ratio after completion of operations, are discussed below.  
Before taking up these provisions, some aspects of crucial relevance are analysed.            
 
Sharī‛ah perspective of stipulating profit / loss sharing ratio at inception 
It would be significant here to verify the level of importance given by sharī‛ah to stipulating 
the profit / loss sharing ratio in equity based contracts.  In joint ventures on shirkah and 
mudārabah, the knowledge of profit / loss sharing ratio is imperative at the inception of the 
contract.
5
  Although there appears to be some difference on whether it is necessary to 
stipulate these aspects in the agreement, a perusal of accepted works of the schools would 
reveal that where this is not required, it is due to the fact that certain schools do not recognise 
the possibility of any variation occurring pertaining to these.  Thus, the Shāfi‛i school holds 
that profit (as well as loss) in shirkah would necessarily be owned by the partners in 
proportion to their respective capitals, irrespective of whether this fact is stipulated in the 
agreement or not.  If any condition is agreed to the contrary, the contract becomes invalid.  
                                                 
4
 Loss distribution in the case of joint investment accounts remain a tricky issue, as the investment and profit 
distribution mechanisms adopted in these accounts almost preclude the possibility of loss distribution in an 
equitable manner.  See Muhammad Abdurrahman Sadique (2006), “A study of equity financing modes for 
Islamic financial institutions in a Shari‟ah perspective,” unpublished doctoral thesis, International Islamic 
University Malaysia, p. 280.    
5
 Al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, p. 94, 135.        
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The position of the Māliki school in this respect is similar, who also state that labour, too, 
would be contributed by the parties in proportion to their capital investment, even when these 
aspects are not stipulated in the contract.
6
  Hanbali jurists, who do not consider it necessary 
that profits be divided on the basis of capital contribution, hold that when partners in a 
contract of shirkah do not stipulate the ratio of profit distribution, it will be divided according 
to the capital investment ratio.
7
  With regard to mudārabah, all schools hold it necessary that 
the proportion of each partner‟s profit should be known at the inception of the contract, so 
much so that ignorance of this aspect results in the invalidity of the contract.  Where general 
reference is made in the contract to profits being shared by the parties without specifying the 
exact proportion of each contractor, all schools of Islamic law regard the contract valid, as 
reference to sharing is taken to denote equal entitlement to profits among the partners.  
Therefore, profits are divided equally between the financier and the fund manager in this 
instance.
8
 
 
It is clear from the above that all schools of Islamic law consider it necessary that the profit 
sharing ratio be clearly fixed at the outset of the equity relationship.  The emphasis placed on 
this issue is justified in view of the fact that sharing of profit (and loss) happens to lie at the 
foundation of equity relationships.  As explained initially, the entitlement to fixed wages for 
labour carried out for the other partner was abandoned in favour of a proportionate share in 
the proceeds of the venture.  Therefore, it is imperative that the means of laying claim to a 
proportionate share thus be clearly agreed on at the inception of the relationship, so as to 
ensure the complete consent of the partners to adopt the equity platform at the cost of 
foregoing the right to lay claim to wages, which they would have been entitled to had they 
adopted an ijārah platform.9  As such, any uncertainty in this regard is held to violate the 
objective of choosing the equity platform, and thus would result in the invalidity of the 
partnership.  The Hanafi jurists have gone so far as to consider profits to be the subject matter 
in the contracts of both shirkah and mudārabah, ignorance of which would lead to their 
invalidity.
10
       
 
Allocation of a lump sum to either partner 
After verifying the necessity of determining the profit / loss sharing ratio in equity 
relationships, we may proceed to examine the nature of the profit allocation upheld by the 
sharī‛ah.  Jurists in general insist that the profit allocation between the partners take place as 
undivided portions (juz’ shā’i‛), i.e. as a proportion of the total profit.  Allocation of a 
specific lump sum amount to either partner invalidates the contract.  As far as the Shāfi‛i and 
Māliki schools are concerned, this is in accordance with their strict adherence to the capital 
investment ratio as the sole basis for profit allocation in shirkah.  In the case of mudārabah, 
Shāfi‛i jurists have clearly upheld that profit should be shared among the parties based on a 
known proportion (juz’iyyah); allotment of a lump sum such as ten to either party, even in 
                                                 
6
 Al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 3, p. 516, al-Khurashi, Hāshiyah al-Khurashi, vol. 6, p. 349.     
7
 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, p. 140, 147.   
8
 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 5, p. 142, al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 203, al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛  al-
Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, p. 135, al-Khurashi, Hāshiyah al-Khurashi, vol. 7, p. 151.     
9
 In place of the fixed and defined wages necessarily required under an ijārah platform for labour, the maximum 
measure of safety that could be provided for labour rendered under a mudārabah / mushārakah arrangement 
would be a clear and unambiguous stipulation regarding the ratios of profit / loss sharing.   
10
 al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, pp. 94, 135.    
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addition to a proportionate share, would invalidate the contract.
11
  The position of Māliki 
jurists is similar.  Al-Mudawwanah categorically rules out the possibility of assigning a 
specific sum, however small it be, to one of the partners in mudārabah, and terms it 
prohibited (harām).  It stresses that the profit should be shared in proportion, every unit of it 
being subject to sharing,
12
 and observes that this is the nature of qirād (i.e. mudārabah) of 
Muslims.  The profit share being agreed as an undivided proportion and not as a specified 
amount is a necessary condition for the validity of mudārabah.13     
 
It would be pertinent to scrutinize the nature of profit allocation in the Hanafi and Hanbali 
schools, who do not insist on adopting the capital investment ratio for this purpose.  These 
two schools are seen to emphasise that the profit shares of equity partners should be mutually 
agreed on as undivided portions (mushā‛) that are clearly known.14  Hanafi jurists consider 
the non-existence of any element leading to disruption of sharing (qat‛ al-shirkah) a 
precondition for the validity of shirkah, and hold the legal consequence (hukm) of shirkah to 
be sharing of profits.  Assigning a lump sum of the profits to either partner results in the 
invalidity of shirkah, as it violates this precondition.
15
  In support of the requirement that the 
profit share of the mudārib and that of either partner in shirkah should necessarily be fixed as 
an undivided proportion (juz’ mushā‛), the Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisi in his al-
Kāfī, among others, has cited the narration that the Holy Prophet (Sal.) had contracted 
mu‛āmalah with the occupants of Khaybar against a proportionate share (shatr) of its 
produce, and has observed that mudārabah is similar to mu‛āmalah in this respect.16  He has 
narrated in al-Mughni the consensus of scholars in this issue as recorded by Ibn al-Munzir.
17
  
Therefore, apportioning a specific amount of the profit, such as ten or hundred, to either 
partner is not allowed.  The reason for this prohibition is that the contract of shirkah dictates 
sharing of profit, and the entitlement of a partner to a specific amount would thwart such 
                                                 
11
 Al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 204, al-Sharbīni, Mughni al-Muhtāj, vol. 2, p. 422, 423, al-
Māwardi, al-Hāwi al-Kabīr, vol. 7, p. 312.      
12
 ريثك وأ ميهق كرش هنم ئيش مك يف ‛Abd al-Salām Sahnūn ibn Sa‛īd, al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrā, vol. 12, p. 89, 
91.      
13
 Muhammad ibn ‛Abd al-Rahmān al-Maghribi al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Bayrūt, Darul Fikr, 1398H, vol. 5, 
p. 358, Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi al-Gharnāti, al-Qawānīn al-Fiqhīyyah, (publisher 
unknown), vol. 1, p. 186.  The Māliki jurist al-‛Adawi, among others, has succinctly expressed the approved 
nature of the profit share as „a share of unknown quantity and known proportion‟ (ةبسننا وىهعم ،ةيمكنا لىهجم) 
such as a quarter of the total profit, and stressed that it should be fixed as a proportion of the total profit solely.  
‛Ali al-Sa‛īdi al-‛Adawi, Hāshiyah al-‛Adawi, Bayrūt, Darul Fikr, 1412H, vol. 2, p. 268, Ahmad ibn Ghunaym 
al-Nafrāwi al-Māliki, al-Fawākih al-Dawāni, Bayrūt, Darul Fikr, 1415H, vol. 2, p. 123.       
14
 ‛Alī ibn Sulaymān al-Mardāwi, al-Insāf, vol. 5, p. 412, Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‛Abd „Allah ibn Ahmad Ibn 
Qudāmah al-Maqdisi, al-Kāfi fī Fiqh ibn Hanbal, Bayrūt, al-Maktab al-Islāmi, 1988, vol. 2, p. 267, Ibn 
Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 5, p. 140, al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, pp. 94, 135.      
15
 Al-Haskafi, al-Durr al-Mukhtar, printed with Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Radd al-Muhtār, vol. 4, pp. 305, 316. 
16
 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Kāfi fī Fiqh ibn Hanbal, vol. 2, p. 267, al-‛Imrāni, al-Bayān, vol. 7, p. 190.  The hadith, 
reported by ibn ‛Umar (Rad.), is recorded by Muslim (vol. 3, p. 1186, hadith No. 1551) and Abū Dāwūd (vol. 3, 
p. 262, hadith No. 3408) among others.    Al-Nawawi has explained shatr to be a known portion such as a half 
or a quarter.  Mu‛āmalah, also referred to as musāqāh, is a contract between an owner of date palms or 
grapevines and a farmer for the upkeep of the plantation against a share in the produce, a contract recognised as 
valid by the majority of jurists except Imām Abū Hanīfah.  Al-Nawawi too has alluded to the similarity borne by 
both mu‛āmalah and muzāra‛ah (a contract between a landowner and a farmer for plantation against a share in 
the produce) to mudārabah, the latter being upheld by ijmā‛.  See al-Nawawi, Sharh al-Nawawi ‛alā Sahīh 
Muslim, Bayrūt, Dār Ihyā al-Turāth al-‛Arabi, 1392H, vol. 10, p. 210.      
17
 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 5, p. 140. 
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sharing.  This ruling is applicable even in the case of mudārabah, as the latter could be 
regarded as a type of shirkah in that it entails partnership in profit.
18
       
 
The above bears out that allocation of a specific sum to a partner is disapproved because it 
contradicts the principle of common sharing in the proceeds.  The texts on this issue indicate 
that according to jurists, sharing is considered necessary to occur in the whole of the profit.  
This suggests that the total profit realised through the venture should be allocated to the 
partners on the basis of joint sharing, where the possibility of a partner laying claim to a 
specific portion of the profit exempted from joint sharing is wholly negated.  It appears that 
the shirkah or joint ownership of the partners in the profits realised, which takes place in both 
shirkah as well as mudārabah according to al-Kāsāni, could be compared to shirkah al-milk, 
where each portion of the relevant entity is jointly owned.  Common ownership would cease 
only at the point of liquidation and division, when the partners would agree on the physical 
division of the profits among them, thus restricting the entitlement of each to an identified 
portion of the profit and abandoning his joint ownership in the rest, in a manner that could be 
compared with sulh.
19
  It could be observed that the concept of joint sharing in an entity 
cannot be reconciled with an instance where one partner is held to own a specific and defined 
amount, as the latter negates the possibility of jointly sharing in each component of the entity.    
 
Through disrupting the mechanism of sharing the profit, such a condition could lead to 
injustice to either party in different situations.  In the event the total profit accruing to the 
venture only amounting to the lump sum, the whole of it would be claimed by one of the 
contractors.  If the profit realised is even less, the stipulation would lead to part of the capital 
being given to the partner entitled to the lump sum.  On the other hand, if the venture results 
in huge profits exceeding the levels anticipated, the party entitled to the fixed sum would be 
prevented from claiming any portion of the excess.
20
     
 
Allocation of a lump sum in addition to a proportionate share 
Due to the above reason, Hanafi and Hanbali jurists have not recognised the possibility of 
allocating a specific amount of profit to one of the partners even in the form of an addition to 
the basic profit share agreed on as a ratio.  Thus, where the partners agree that one of them is 
entitled to a third, i.e. 33%, of the total profit and an additional hundred, the latter being a 
specific sum stipulated in addition to the agreed proportionate share, the contract is held 
invalid.  Ibn Qudāmah has narrated in this context the consensus recorded by Ibn al-Munzir 
that the contract of mudārabah becomes void through the stipulation of a specific amount to 
either partner or both of them, and has asserted that this is the verdict of Imāms Mālik, al-
Awzā‛i, al-Shāfi‛i, Abū Thawr and the Hanafi jurists.21  Similarly, agreement on a specific 
sum being deducted from the proportionate share of profit of a partner would result in the 
invalidity of the contract.  Hanafi jurists argue that such a condition would interfere with a 
genuine sharing of the profit
22
, which could violate the objective of partnership.  This further 
                                                 
18
 al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, p. 94.  Māliki jurists too have considered a variety of shirkah to exist 
with regard to mudārabah profits prior to their division.  See al-Dardīr, al-Sharh al-Kabīr, vol. 3, p. 517.      
19
 The comparison with shirkah al-milk here, as obvious, is not complete, as profits do not have an entity of their 
own until liquidation and separation, and remain mingled with the capital during the tenure of the contract.     
20
 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, p. 148.   
21
 For details see ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 5, p. 148. 
22
 I.e. حبرنا يف ةكرشنا عطق بجىي طرش, a recurrent expression appearing in this context.   al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-
Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, p. 135.   
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supports the above inference that jurists had envisaged sharing in the whole profit on the 
basis of an agreed ratio.  Hence, sharing in the profits could not be held to materialise if a 
lump sum is reserved for one party even when a ratio is applied for division of the remaining 
profit, as the lump sum reserved thus would be exempt from common sharing.  Hanafi jurists 
have explored various instances regarding the incorporation of such clauses in mudārabah.23 
 
Stipulation on unilateral entitlement to profits exceeding a specific amount 
It was established above that Islamic sharī‛ah requires precise knowledge of the profit sharing 
ratio at the inception of a mushārakah / mudārabah relationship, even according to the 
schools that regard the partners entitled to playing a role in its determination, and that 
exemption of even a part of the profit from such proportionate division would invalidate the 
contract.  We could now consider the stipulation that where profits are realised in excess of a 
defined ceiling, the excess profit would be claimed by one of the partners to the exclusion of 
the other.   
 
Such stipulation in mushārakah / mudārabah agreements is sought for the purpose of allowing 
a partner who plans only to realise a certain amount of profit through the venture and is 
willing to forgo any excess in favour of the other party.  The stipulation would be effective 
only where profits in excess of the defined ceiling are realised.  If the case is otherwise, 
profits realised would be shared according to the specific ratio agreed by the partners as is 
usual in equity ventures, and the stipulation would remain inoperative.  Similarly, if the joint 
venture results in loss, the loss would be borne by the partners proportionate to their capital 
investment, unhampered by the additional stipulation.     
 
This condition could be resorted to by Islamic banks in investment accounts offered to the 
public usually on mudārabah basis, and also in equity ventures jointly initiated with a client 
as the mudārabah / mushārakah working partner.  The purpose in both instances is to limit the 
amount of profit the bank achieves through the venture to a certain predetermined margin, 
generally reflected as a percentage of return on the capital invested.  The excess profit 
renounced thus by the bank in favour of the joint partners could be defined as what exceeds a 
specific percentage of the total capital before division of profits, or as what is realised by the 
bank as its profit share in excess of a specific percentage of its capital contribution.  It was 
mentioned above that alluding to a percentage of a known capital is materially equivalent to 
referring to a fixed sum.
24
  Thus, in both instances the application of the profit sharing ratio is 
confined to a specific sum, any profit realised in excess of it being entitled to by the equity 
partner solely, to the exclusion of the bank.  While any amount of profit realised through the 
venture below the specified sum or equal to it is subjected to division among the partners 
according to the agreed ratio, any excess would be exempted from such division, irrespective 
of the amount. 
 
The ultimate consequence of this stipulation is that the bank is enabled to claim a specific 
sum as the return on its investment, however, only when the venture has succeeded in 
realising a minimum level of profit.  Even if the venture generates profits over and above the 
minimum level thus identified, the bank would suffice itself with claiming the fixed amount 
of return, irrespective of the size of the total profit.  However, if the venture realises less 
profits than anticipated due to acceptable reasons and falls short of achieving the minimum 
                                                 
23
 al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, p. 136.   
24
 See section above on appraisal of the rate of return cum period method 4-5.   
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level, the bank is bound to share in the realised profits according to the agreed ratio, or even 
suffer capital loss in an extreme situation.   
 
Would such an agreement be at variance with the requirement that profits should be jointly 
entitled to by the partners, and refute the possibility of sharing in profits (shirkah fī al-ribh) 
deemed necessary by jurists both in shirkah as well as mudārabah?  Allotment of a specific 
sum to a partner, either in isolation or coupled with a proportionate share of profits, was 
disapproved by jurists as it was held to negate the principle of sharing the profit, i.e. the 
whole of it.  Sharing, as described above, requires that the share accruing to a partner be fixed 
as an undivided share of the whole profit, i.e. a proportion, both in mushārakah as well as 
mudārabah, so that the share of each partner may fluctuate freely corresponding to the profit 
realised through the venture, irrespective of its volume.  In ruling out the application of the 
ratio to profits earned in excess of a specific sum, there appears to be an inconsistency with 
this fundamental characteristic of profit division prescribed for equity relationships.  
However, the situation here cannot be fully equated with that of allocating a specific sum to a 
partner, as in the latter case, there is a possibility of the partner who is entitled to the specific 
sum securing the whole profit, when the entire profit realised through venture does not 
exceed the specific sum.  In the circumstance in question, although the bank is entitled to a 
specific sum when the venture achieves a minimum level of profits, this could occur only 
after the client has secured his share of profit as dictated by the agreed ratio within the set 
minimum level.  Hence, the stipulation could not possibly lead to total deprivation of a 
partner from profits in any situation.   
 
Contemporary sharī‛ah approach to the issue 
The stipulation in question being one that interests Islamic bankers greatly for reasons that 
will be presently discussed, several sharī‛ah supervisory boards and other bodies related to 
Islamic banking have taken it up for consideration.  One of the first who have confronted this 
issue appears to be the sharī‛ah supervisory board of the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan.  In a 
collection of rulings made by this board published in 1982, a question related to the issue is 
answered.  The question probes the possibility of remitting profits that exceed a given sum to 
the partner while agreeing to share profits equally.
25
  The answer, while upholding the 
invalidity of partnership due to stipulating a fixed sum to one of the parties where this leads 
to a partner being deprived of sharing the profits, asserts that if the stipulation is not expected 
to result in such deprivation, it would be lawful.  This is supported with a quotation from a 
book named al-Bahr al-Zakhkhār, which reads as follows: “if one of the parties asks for ten if 
the profits exceed a stated amount, the stipulation is correct and binding as there is no reason 
to consider it invalid.”  Accordingly, the answer holds the agreement in this instance 
permissible, since the profit is shared in common between the two parties; stipulating what 
exceeds the specified amount of profits for the bank‟s partner will not result in not sharing in 
the profits because the partner will not be entitled to it except after both the bank and the 
partner had taken 50% of the agreed amount of profits when it is realised. 
                                                 
25
 Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board of Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, Rules of the Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board English 
Series No 5, Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, 1982, p. 92, Question No. 11.  The relevant part of the question is as 
follows: „… Is it permissible for FIB in such situations to make a mutual agreement with the partners to share 
the realized profits equally, i.e. 50% each, provided that when the profits exceeds a given sum, e.g. LS 40,000 or 
more the bank will accept a given sum from that amount, say LS 20,000 in the given example, and remit the 
remainder to the partner, notwithstanding the surplus in profits realized…?‟  The question and the answer are 
also reproduced in A Compendium of Legal Opinions on the Operations of Islamic Banks (by Yusuf Talal 
DeLorenzo (ed.), London, Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 2001, p. 258, hereinafter referred to as the 
Compendium), however, with some critical flaws that have made the meaning ambiguous.       
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A similar position has been upheld in verdicts issued by several other bodies subsequently.  
The second conference of Islamic banks held in Kuwait in 1983 resolves that it is permissible 
to stipulate a specific sum to any equity partner when the profits exceed a specified limit.  
This stipulation is not deemed to result in non-sharing of the profit.
26
  The conference on 
Islamic economics held in Medina in 1983 rules it lawful for the financier to agree with the 
fund manager that if profits exceed the capital invested, e.g., by 15% in a year, the excess will 
accrue to the fund manager, provided the profit is divided based on calculations done in 
accordance with the agreed proportion.
27
  
 
Following the precedent set by these resolutions, the Sharī‛ah Standards of AAOIFI 2002, 
while negating the possibility of stipulating a lump sum of profit for a partner, allows the 
partners in mudārabah or mushārakah to agree that if the profit realised is above a certain 
ceiling, the excess would belong to a particular partner.
28
  The basis for this ruling, as given, 
is that this stipulation is not inconsistent with profit sharing.  Reference to the work al-Bahr 
al-Zakhkhar is cited in support.   
 
Observations 
The position maintained by these bodies appears to have considered the stipulation in 
question not contrary to sharing in profits (shirkah fī al-ribh), as the partner securing the 
fixed lump sum (i.e. the bank, invariably) when the profits reach the agreed ceiling, or the 
other partner, cannot be held to be deprived of a share in the proceeds in any situation.  Since 
the bank would be entitled to a part of the profits, even though static and unvarying 
corresponding to the volume of total profits realised, and the other partner, too, would 
succeed in securing the balance, none of the partners is totally deprived.  Consequently, 
sharing in the profits is considered to have materialised in an acceptable manner.  According 
to this approach, as long as the agreement results in each partner securing some part of the 
profit, even though not always in accordance with a ratio, it is deemed sufficient for the 
validity of the contract.  This could imply that the prohibition of assigning a lump sum to a 
partner would be applicable only when it could result in a partner being totally deprived of 
profits in some situation.  Therefore, if such additional measures could be included in the 
agreement that could prevent its occurrence, specifying a lump sum to a partner should be 
acceptable, and the requirement of sharing in profits considered fulfilled.  
 
In the light of the preceding discussion pertaining to the nature of the profit share, it is 
observed that the above inference, although deserving merit on its own, could not be held to 
be consistent with the perception of sharing in profits as dictated by the theory of equity 
contracts.  As clearly set forth by jurists of all schools of Islamic law, the profit share of each 
partner in an equity contract is necessarily perceived to be an undivided portion (juz’ mushā‛) 
of the whole profit.  The purpose of this requirement is clear; the profit share should fluctuate 
freely with the increase or decrease of the total profit generated, so that at any given volume 
of profits realised, the partners could equitably claim a proportionate share according to the 
ratio adopted.  Thus, the whole profit realised through the venture would be subject to sharing 
                                                 
26
 Dubai Islamic Bank, al-Fatāwa al-Shari‛īyyah fī al-A‛māl al-Masrafīyyah, 2nd Ed., 1996, vol. 1, p. 32. 
27
 Dubai Islamic Bank, al-Fatāwa al-Shari‛īyyah fī al-A‛māl al-Masrafīyyah, vol. 1, p. 32, The Compendium, p. 
214, Research and Development Dept. of Dallah Albaraka, Fatawa: Shariah Rulings on Economics, Jeddah, 
Dallah Albaraka, 1994, p. 97.     
28
 AAOIFI, Sharia Standards 2002, pp. 204, 233, mushārakah standard no. 3/1/5/9 and mudārabah standard no. 
8/5.    
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between the partners based on the agreed ratio, which process is construed as shirkah fī al-
ribh or sharing of profits, a precondition for the validity of equity contracts.  The primary 
reason a stipulation assigning a lump sum to either partner, either alone or coupled with a 
proportionate share of profits, is disapproved evidently is that it interferes with the 
unhindered functioning of the ratio in dividing profits among partners, referred to as qat‛ al-
shirkah or disruption of sharing.  The possibility of deprivation of a partner from any share in 
the profits in certain situations is only an adverse outcome of this stipulation, and may not be 
held to be the fundamental reason for the invalidity of the contract in this event.  Thus, the 
mere absence of this particular outcome would not necessarily mean that sharing in profits as 
envisaged in equity relationships has materialised.  In addition, a negative outcome pointed 
out by jurists
29
 is clearly existent in the situation in question, namely, that of the partner 
entitled to the fixed amount upon the profits reaching the identified ceiling being deprived of 
sharing in the profits generated in excess, even though these may be far higher than was 
anticipated, thus putting him at a clear disadvantage.   
 
As evident from the previous discussion, the accepted works of Islamic law do not mention 
any exception to the requirement that the profit share be an undivided proportion, which 
dictates, as aptly put forth by the eminent jurist Sahnūn, „sharing in every little or much‟ of 
the profit, i.e. sharing in every unit, irrespective of the volume of total profit.  The description 
provided by al-‛Adawi of the approved nature of the profit share as „a share of unknown 
quantity and known proportion‟ (majhūl al-kammīyyah, ma‛lūm al-nisbah) appears in 
keeping with the verdicts of all other schools.
30
  Therefore, it could be said that delimiting the 
application of the requirement that the profit share be fixed as an undivided proportion to a 
specific ceiling, recognising the possibility of assigning a lump sum profit not subject to 
proportionate division for profits exceeding it, appears unparalleled and inconsistent with the 
general concept of equity relationships.     
 
The banking implications of this provision too demand consideration.  Due the dominance of 
the interest-based financing, interest rates primarily fixed for loan capital provided by 
conventional banks play a major role in determining the profit that could be generated 
through investment of risk capital supplied by Islamic banks.  As pointed out earlier, 
calculation of profit share by Islamic banks, even in the case of joint ventures based on equity 
financing, is done through employing the rate of return on capital and the period of 
exposure.
31
  Although the profit sharing mechanism is converted into a ratio and expressed as 
such on mushārakah / mudārabah agreements for sharī‛ah compliance, for all intents and 
purposes, the underlying means adopted for calculation remain to be that of rates of return, 
that primarily envisage a fixed return on capital.  Equity financing finds itself at sharp 
variance with a system based on rates of return on the issue of uncertain profits.  Due to the 
fact that profit and loss sharing lies at the foundation of equity financing, the inherent 
uncertainty in this regard may not be completely eliminated.  However, the predominant 
culture of interest based lending appears to constrain Islamic banks into adopting measures to 
minimise the level of uncertainty with regard to the return even in equity ventures.  As a 
result, a large number of joint ventures currently financed by Islamic banks are ones that 
                                                 
29
 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, p. 148.  See section 4-18 on allocation of a lump sum to either partner.  The 
answer provided by the sharī‛ah supervisory board of Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, in spite of mentioning this 
possibility, does not seem to have taken it into consideration in their final verdict.  See Sharī‛ah Supervisory 
Board of Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, Rules of the Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board English Series No 5, p. 92, 
Question No. 11.    
30
 See section above on allocation of a lump sum to either partner for references.   
31
 See for details sections above on method of determining the profit ratio.   
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carry a minimum level of risk and near-certain profits.  This is well-acknowledged in the 
query put forth by the management of the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan pertaining to the 
stipulation in question to its sharī‛ah board.32  Curbing the uncertainty in profits in equity 
ventures and bringing them closer to conventional norms, thus limiting the share of proceeds 
entrepreneurs have to forgo for obtaining finance to interest payable on conventional loan 
capital, could be achieved to some extent through the stipulation in question, which could 
serve the purpose of inducing entrepreneurs to availing of Islamic banking facilities.  
However, in the process, as the profits expected are nearly certain, and the level of profits at 
the realisation of which the share of the bank would freeze would be fixed in a way that 
enables the bank to achieve the relevant rate of return and no more, the operation of the profit 
sharing ratio could be reduced to little more than a theoretical possibility.       
 
Looking at the overall implications of this move, the adverse effects thereof become 
immediately clear; the bank‟s investors, the original providers of funds who were already 
deprived of a fair return on the risk capital extended by them due to an equity financing 
mechanism constrained by a profit share calculation method based on rate of return cum 
period
33
, would be denied even any unexpected additional amount of profit they could have 
gained through the fair operation of a profit sharing ratio.  The possible benefit to the 
investors through the ventures funded by the bank generating higher profits than was 
expected would be effectively barred through the stipulation, which would allow the 
entrepreneurs lay claim to any profit realised over the specified ceiling exclusively.  Thus, the 
maximum profit accruable to the bank‟s investors would be limited, as could be expected in 
the current scenario, to the prevalent rate of return
34
, while their funds would be freely 
exposed only to the prospect of earning even less profits through the application of the profit 
sharing ratio when the expected level of profits fail to materialise, and to that of capital loss.  
Consequently, the stipulation, by curtailing the equity mechanism from functioning even to 
the extent possible within the current constraints, could result in defeating a fundamental 
objective of equity financing, namely, achieving an equitable distribution of wealth among all 
segments of the populace.  Thus, despite of any ancillary benefits of a short-term nature 
reaped by the banking industry, the stipulation appears untenable even from a perspective of 
maqāsid.    
 
Stipulation reserving right to alter profit sharing ratio initially agreed 
For reasons mentioned above,  Islamic banks could sometimes stipulate at the inception of 
equity ventures that the profit sharing ratio as agreed on the contract initially could be revised 
                                                 
32
 In fairness to the management of Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, it should be stated that they had adequately 
outlined the background of the issue in their question.  They state: “… Nowadays the chances of loss attributed 
to the nature or choice of the project have become very remote.  Fields of investment have become so obvious 
that one may even claim that they have become almost automatic… Within this recognized development in 
science and technology the bank, in carrying out its investment policies, enters into agreements and contracts 
whereby the bank mutually agrees to share the profits realized at a given percentage.  Whereas the projects 
financed by the bank under such agreements or contracts in most instances have a high rate of return and 
profitability and are almost certain to make profits…”  See Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board of Faisal Islamic Bank 
Sudan, Rules of the Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board English Series No 5, p. 92, Question No. 11.  The question 
makes it amply clear that the profits expected through the ventures are almost certain (the original Arabic 
version uses the term madmūnah, i.e, guaranteed), and thus reserving a lump sum would not be materially 
different from assigning profits based on a ratio.   
33
 See sections above on method of determining the profit distribution ratio for details.   
34
 Out of all profits realised by the bank, a part would necessarily be taken up for covering costs, the profit share 
of the bank management etc. and possibly, reserves, before being remitted to investors.      
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later and a new ratio adopted for sharing profits with the mutual agreement of the parties.  
Thus, the partners would be free to effect the profit division at the finalisation of the contract 
based on a ratio freshly agreed, disregarding the ratio determined at commencement.  As 
obvious, this would require that all the partners agree on adopting the new ratio.  
Theoretically the need for such alteration could arise if, upon commencing operations, the 
progress of the venture demands additional labour input from one of the partners than was 
anticipated, leading to the partner‟s dissatisfaction with the original ratio agreed for profit 
sharing.  For compensating for the additional labour, which could be in the form of an 
increase of the quantity of labour or the contribution of a specialised expertise, the partners 
could feel the need to revise the profit sharing ratio, rather than annulling the contract.  This 
is so because, as far as the capital contributions are concerned, these have been known at the 
inception, as the validity of the contract demands the existence of the capital at 
commencement.  Any fresh infusion of capital from one of the parties or both possibly 
resulting in the adjustment of the capital contribution ratio could usually demand renewal of 
the contract.  With regard to the possibility of a revision of the ratio merely due to a partner 
not achieving an expected amount of profit as his share, it should be noted that the equity 
platform presumes the willingness of the parties to accept the proportionate share of any 
amount of proceeds generated by the venture as agreed.  In an extreme situation, it could 
demand acceptance of even the loss of capital, proportionate to the ratio of capital input.  
Thus, irrespective of the amount of total profit realised, the parties are supposed to share it 
according to the ratio adopted.  In spite of this inherent nature of equity relationships, could 
the parties reserve the right to revise the ratio on a later occasion, which would include the 
final stage of the contract where the profits realised are about to be divided, due to any of the 
above reasons?  The sharī‛ah perspective of this issue is analysed hereunder.   
 
Sharī‛ah perspective of revising agreed profit sharing ratio 
Evidently there could not exist any possibility of such revision according to schools that 
uphold the ratio of capital input as the only ratio acceptable for the purpose of profit division 
in contracts where every partner contributes capital.  Therefore, under the Shāfi‛i and Māliki 
laws, partners in a shirkah necessarily have to carry out the division of profit and bear 
liability according to the capital investment ratio.  Adopting any other ratio, either at the 
inception itself or when the venture has commenced operations is not allowed.   
 
However, restricting profit division ratio to that of capital investment is evidently not 
applicable in equity contracts based on mudārabah.  Therefore, we may verify whether the 
possibility of a later adjustment of the profit division ratio initially agreed exists under 
mudārabah contracts.  The Shāfi‛i school is seen to deny such a provision categorically as one 
that is inconsistent with the nature of a valid contract of mudārabah, similar to one of the 
partners being entitled to the whole profit.  Any change to the profit share assigned to the 
fund-manager would be admissible only under a fresh contract, after the former contract is 
rescinded.
35
  Māliki jurists appear to have allowed mudārabah contractors to revise the 
stipulated ratio and adopt a different ratio with mutual consent even after the mudārib had 
commenced operations.  They uphold its permissibility during the tenure of the mudārabah 
when the capital has been converted to merchandise, as it would be tantamount to an 
                                                 
35
 Al-‛Imrāni, al-Bayān, vol. 7, p. 197.  The relevant text indicates that the position of Imām Abū Hanīfah in this 
regard is to the contrary.  The Shāfi‛i position on one of the mudārabah partners being entitled to the whole 
profit is that the contract becomes invalid through such stipulation.  If profits are realised under the contract, 
they belong to the financier solely.  The fund manager is entitled to just recompense (ujrah al-mithl).  See al-
Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 203.     
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undefined gift from one of them to the other voluntarily, which is recognised as valid in 
Māliki theory.36  Such an adjustment to the ratio at this stage has been condoned because 
realisation of profits remains uncertain.
37
  However, this permission is not granted by Māliki 
jurists unanimously, as some consider such adjustment valid only if effected prior to the fund 
manager commencing operations.  This restriction is based on the fact that according to 
Māliki theory, contrary to the other schools, the contract of Mudārabah becomes binding 
(lāzim) after commencement of operations.  If the partners agree on any adjustment to the 
profit sharing ratio before, this appears to be approved by Māliki jurists in general, as it is 
similar to initiating a fresh contract.
38
 
  
Hanafi jurists have upheld the possibility of adjustment to the profit sharing ratio even after 
mudārabah operations have resulted in profit or loss.  If the partners mutually adopt a ratio 
different from what was agreed initially at any stage of the mudārabah, the total profit 
realised, i.e. what was realised before the adjustment as well as what was realised afterwards, 
is shared according to the ratio as agreed later, and the former ratio disregarded.
39
  This is 
because the contract is held to be in force until the capital is returned to the financier.  
According to Hanafi theory of binding contracts (‛uqūd lāzimah), during the tenure of the 
contract, any later addition to or deduction from the terms of the contract become part of the 
original contract, and are upheld as such.
40
  They assert that this principle is applicable to 
mudārabah, a non-binding contract (‛aqd jā’z), a fortiori.  As observed by al-Kāsāni in a 
similar context, it is acknowledged that the parties have the right to revoke the contract, 
which amounts to more than changing the terms of the contract.  This is because revocation 
involves abolishing the essence (asl) of the contract as well as its characteristics (wasf), while 
change only involves altering the characteristics, leaving the essence intact.  Therefore, the 
parties are necessarily entitled to changing the contract.
41
  The Hanafi jurist Abū Yūsuf has 
allowed adjustment to the profit sharing ratio in the form of an addition to or subtraction from 
the share of the fund manager even after distribution of profits.  According to Muhammad, 
while reducing the fund manager‟s share is allowed in this instance, adding to it is not 
allowed.
42
  He reasons that the contract had concluded with the division of profits and the 
financier recovering his capital.  The fund manager is entitled to his share against the labour 
he had provided, which had ceased with the conclusion of the contract.  Therefore, its 
exchange (badal), i.e. the profit share, may not be increased subsequently, while it could be 
                                                 
36
 Al-‛Abdari, al-Tāj wa al-Iklīl, vol. 5, p. 363.   
37
 This could indicate that they do not regard a change of ratio valid after the profit or loss has been ascertained.   
38
 al-Khurashi, Hāshiyah al-Khurashi, vol. 7, p. 156.  Ibn al-Qāsim sees such an alteration acceptable even after 
commencement of operations.  See ‛Abd al-Salām Sahnūn ibn Sa‛īd, al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrā, vol. 12, p. 90. 
39
 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, p. 108, al-Shaykh al-Nizām, al-Fatāwā al-‛Ālamkīrīyyah, vol. 4, p. 322.   
40
 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, p. 108.  This is when such incorporation does not necessitate invalidity of the 
original contract.  When any later addition could result in the invalidity of the original contract, e.g. a later 
addition to an exchange of ribawi items, Hanafi jurists differ on whether the later addition would be 
incorporated to the original contract or not.  See for details al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 5, p. 261.   
41
 al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 5, p. 259.  The context relates to the right of parties in a contract of sale to 
add to or deduct from the price or the merchandise, and to effecting an increase in the mahr.  Al-Kāsāni has 
drawn support for the latter from the Qur‟ānic verse: “there is no blame on you in what you mutually agree with 
subsequent to the stipulated mahr” (Q. 4: 24).  This permission is subject to necessary conditions such as the 
consent of the other party and unity of the session.  He observes that these conditions are not applicable to a 
decrease of the price as it is essentially a relinquishment (ibrā’).  According to Imām al-Shāfi‛i, adding to or 
deducting from the price or the merchandise is considered to be a gift (hibah) contracted afresh, and would not 
relate to the original contract of sale.  This discussion carries a host of important ancillary details.  Ibid.              
42
 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, p. 109, al-Shaykh al-Nizām, al-Fatāwā al-‛Ālamkīrīyyah, vol. 4, p. 322. 
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reduced.  This is similar to a contract of sale after the sold item has ceased to exist; while the 
price may not be increased, it could be reduced.
43
     
 
It can be gathered from the above discussion that Hanafi and Māliki jurists are unanimous in 
allowing change of the profit sharing ratio before the commencement of operations.  
Although Hanafi jurists regard such a revision valid even after the mudārabah had resulted in 
profit or loss, Māliki jurists appear to restrict the permissibility of such change to the tenure 
of the mudārabah, before the outcome of operations is known.  Thus, it is Hanafi jurists who 
recognise change of the ratio prior to liquidation after the profitability of the venture has been 
ascertained.  It could be assumed that their position in the case of shirkah would be similar, as 
the latter, too, happens to be a non-binding contract.             
     
Contemporary sharī‛ah approach 
Similar to the provision curtailing the profit share of a partner to a specific ceiling, it is 
evident that the provision facilitating revision of the profit sharing ratio has been a subject of 
interest to Islamic banks and related scholarly bodies.  The issue is seen to have been 
analysed by a number of sharī‛ah supervisory boards and conferences.  Being an early entry 
in the arena of Islamic banking, Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan has queried its sharī‛ah 
supervisory board regarding the lawfulness of such a provision as recorded in the collection 
of the latter‟s rulings referred to earlier.  The question relates to the permissibility of a 
contractual term calling for reassessment of the agreed share of profits if it is proved at the 
end of the operations that the percentage previously agreed was unfavourable to a party.  In 
its answer, the sharī‛ah supervisory board has upheld the possibility of altering the terms 
governing the mudārabah contract anytime with the consent of the parties provided the newly 
added term is within the accepted sharī‛ah rules.  The bank could include a term in the 
mudārabah contract allowing reassessment of the profit share at the end of each operation or 
at the end of each year.  The board has referred to the manual of Khalīl on Māliki law in 
support.  It has further upheld the permissibility of altering the percentage of shares in the 
profits in partnerships involving capital advanced by both parties.
44
  This position appears to 
have been endorsed by some other entities.  The fourth Albaraka seminar held in 1984 has 
issued a ruling stressing that the profit shares of both the bank and the investor be fixed as 
undivided shares and that they remain effective during the tenure of mudārabah.  If the profit 
ratio is to be changed in the future, the partner should be notified.  The ruling holds that if the 
investor does not object to the change within a period stipulated for the purpose, it would be 
taken as an indication of his consent.
45
  
 
Sharī‛ah Standards of AAOIFI has referred to the above rulings by the Albaraka seminar and 
the sharī‛ah board of Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan in support of its recognition of the 
permissibility of an agreement to change the ratio of profit distribution anytime in a contract 
of mudārabah.  The basis for this is that profit is a right belonging to the parities and the 
provision in question does not lead to a prohibited act such as preclusion of sharing in profit; 
                                                 
43
 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, p. 109.  This is according to the position upheld by Abū Yūsuf and 
Muhammad.  According to Imām Abū Hanīfah, continued existence of the subject matter is not a requirement 
for any addition to or reduction of the subject matter or the price after the contract.  Therefore, both increase as 
well as decrease is allowed.  See for details al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 5, p. 259, 260.        
44
 Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board of Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, Rules of the Sharī‛ah Supervisory Board English 
Series No 5, p. 87, Question No. 4.  The question and the answer are partially reproduced in the Compendium, p. 
212.   
45
 Dallah Albaraka, Fatawa: Shariah Rulings on Economics, p. 99, Compendium, p. 216. 
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rather, it makes the parties partners in profit.
46
  In the case of mushārakah, after upholding the 
impermissibility of deferring the determination of profit percentages due to each partner until 
the realisation of profit, the Sharī‛ah Standards holds that the parties may bilaterally agree to 
amend the percentages of profit sharing on the date of distribution, on the basis that the profit 
belongs to them.
47
     
 
Observations 
In essence, the above rulings have as their base the permissibility to amend the profit sharing 
ratio in mudārabah contracts as upheld by the Hanafi and Māliki schools in varying degrees.  
The unlimited permissibility recognised by the modern bodies allowing the partners to alter 
the ratio at anytime is restricted by Māliki jurists to the period before the calculation of profit 
and loss.  However, as shown above, Hanafi jurists have upheld its validity even at the point 
of liquidation.  The ruling could be extended to shirkah contracts based on the reasons 
provided by Hanafi jurists.  Thus, the rulings appear to be in accordance with the theory of 
equity contracts as expounded by the Hanafi school.  It is noteworthy here that what is 
recognised by Hanafi jurists is a spontaneous change of the profit ratio at a later stage based 
on mutual consent.  A stipulation in the original contract that envisages the prospect of such a 
change in the future could not possibly be ascribed to Hanafi jurists, and should be regarded 
as an original ruling by the contemporary bodies.   
 
It would be pertinent to survey the implications of this provision in a banking perspective.  
The observations made earlier with regard to the provision to curtail the operation of the 
profit ratio to a specific ceiling could also be applicable here to a large extent.
48
  As pointed 
out there, the indefinite nature of the profit share in Islamic equity financing modes is a vital 
aspect where modern banking practice finds itself at variance.  The provision to revise the 
profit sharing ratio could easily be adopted as a tool of convenience to circumvent the 
sharī‛ah regulation in this regard, i.e. that the profit share be fixed as an undivided portion.  In 
a business environment where interest based lending is the norm and the provisions of which 
are considered to be conducive, parties to an equity contract may perceive it to be in their 
interest to adopt measures that reduce the uncertainty in the amount of profit accruing to 
either of them, or facilitate one of them to achieve a predetermined rate of return on his 
capital.  The equity structure as upheld by Islamic sharī‛ah emphasises determination of the 
profit sharing ratio clearly at the outset, and does not allow its deferment until realisation of 
profits.  Deciding the ratio of profit division may not be vested on boards of management or 
other relevant bodies to be carried out at the end of the term after verification of 
profitability.
49
  However, this end could be conveniently achieved by incorporating the above 
provision in the contract.   
 
On the other hand, it should also be remembered that the permissibility of such alteration 
presumes a contract made by partners enjoying equal bargaining positions, able to assert their 
individual demands freely.  However, standard agreements of mudārabah and mushārakah 
proffered by Islamic banks generally belong to contracts of adhesion, where the client / 
                                                 
46
 AAOIFI, Sharia Standards 2002, pp. 233, 243, mudārabah standard no. 8/3. 
47
 AAOIFI, Sharia Standards 2002, pp. 204, 221, mushārakah standard no. 3/1/5/2.   
48
 See section above on contemporary sharī‛ah approach to stipulation on profit exceeding a specific amount.    
49
 This is the verdict of 2
nd
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partner is not given much leeway for insisting on his terms.  Therefore, after finalising an 
agreement that contains the above clause, the client could not be expected but to agree to any 
ratio as unilaterally decided by the bank management after realisation of profits.  As provided 
in the ruling by the Albaraka seminar mentioned above, even lack of response from the client 
could be held to indicate acceptance.  Thus, the inherent danger of the provision in question 
being misused should not be underestimated.  If the provision is adopted for securing ends 
incompatible with the philosophy of equity financing, it could prove detrimental to the cause 
of Islamic banking in general.   
 
Therefore, it is necessary that incorporation of provisions of this nature should not be allowed 
or encouraged with regard to every Islamic bank without distinction.  Rather, before 
approving the inclusion of such clauses in mudārabah / mushārakah agreements, sharī‛ah 
supervisory boards concerned should study the nature and disposition of their respective 
banks individually, choosing their incorporation only where the possibility of misuse is 
minimum.      
 
Conclusion                              
Equity participation, being a mode based on joint investment for mutual sharing of gains and 
liability, is adopted without the encumbrance of ensuring a preset capital return to a single 
partner by individuals and business firms in all societies.  Islamic banks need to adopt an 
approach similar to these and strive at desisting from furthering their identity as lending 
institutions, a pioneer step towards which goal would be upholding a proper profit and loss 
sharing mechanism.  For realising the benefits of equity financing, its operation should not be 
hindered through measures that strip it of its characteristics.  A central pillar of the equity 
structure is the unbridled operation of the profit sharing ratio.  Restriction of its application to 
a stipulated level of profits, thereby enabling a partner to claim unlimited profits while the 
profit share of the other is restricted to a maximum ceiling cannot be regarded to be 
consistent with the theory of equity participation.  Any measure that curtails the free 
operation the profit sharing mechanism could result in defeating the objectives of equity 
financing.  Similarly, a provision that envisages the possibility of adjusting the profit sharing 
ratio prior to liquidation does not seem appropriate in the prevalent environment of interest 
based banking, and could be easily misused.   While these measures could realise some 
temporary benefit to Islamic banks, they may become deep-rooted in the concept of equity 
financing itself, thus making it operate subservient to debt financing norms forever.  
Therefore, introduction of such measures should be carefully monitored by the sharī‛ah 
supervisory boards of Islamic banks and other relevant bodies so as to avoid their harmful 
effects. 
 
